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THESIS ABSTRACT
Jonathan Brophy
Master of Science
Department of Computer and Information Science
June 2017
Title: Collective Classification of Social Network Spam
Unsolicited messages affects virtually every popular social media website,
and spammers have become increasingly proficient at bypassing conventional
filters, prompting a stronger effort to develop new methods. First, we build an
independent model using features that capture the cases where spam is obvious.
Second, a relational model is built, taking advantage of the interconnected
nature of users and their comments. By feeding our initial predictions from the
independent model into the relational model, we can propagate and jointly infer the
labels of all comments at the same time. This allows us to capture the obfuscated
spam comments missed by the independent model that are only found by looking
at the relational structure of the social network. The results from our experiments
shows that models utilizing the underlying structure of the social network are more
effective at detecting spam than ones that do not.
This thesis includes previously published coauthored material.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The appearance of spam in a social network can be any instance of
unsolicited or unwanted actions by a user in the network. Traditional methods of
classifying spam have resulted in many content-based approaches that characterize
spam in messages, email, social media comments, etc. The increase in scale of
many popular social media websites has created greater incentives for spammers
to find new ways of bypassing traditional filters. Even if only a small fraction of
a spammer’s campaign gets through a spam filter, there can be a large number of
users that will see those messages, making it worthwhile for the spammer. These
spammers can avoid detection by randomizing the content of their messages, or
manipulating their content in a way that fools the content-based classifier.
An alternative method could classify spammers based on actions performed
between users in a social network Fakhraei, Foulds, Shashanka, and Getoor (2015).
This is a more robust method of detecting spammers as changing user behavior to
bypass spam filters is more difficult than altering spam messages individually. For
example, a graph structure could be built around users following other users, where
nodes represent users and directed edges represent users following other users.
Perhaps legitimate behavior is characterized by having many followers (node with
a large in-degree). Thus, a spammer might have difficulty simulating legitimate
behavior because they cannot get other users to follow them, making them easier to
find among all the other users.
By using aspects of both content and graph-based systems, a spam detection
model can capture certain signals that a system focused on only one approach
could miss. Combining these methods also gives the added benefit of finding spam
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messages and spammers. Detecting spam messages themselves may be sufficient
for certain domains, but generally it is more useful to characterize the users that
are generating the spam to more efficiently prevent similar spam campaigns in the
future.
The combination of content and graph-based systems is an improvement,
but both of these approaches still consider the data to be independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.). They look at incoming spam messages one at a time,
and based on characteristics about the spam message itself, as well as the user’s
previous behavior, make a decision about whether it should be labeled as spam
or not spam. Social network spam is not i.i.d. This provides the opportunity to
exploit the interconnected nature of spammers, spam comments, and any other
domain-specific entities that tie spammers to their spam.
Our approach is motivated by soundcloud.com, a social network for sharing
music. This domain is an excellent place to test out a statistical relational model
because it can exploit the underlying structure between users, messages, and
the uploaded tracks where messages are posted. Our approach uses a type of
probabilistic graphical model called hinge-loss Markov random fields (HL-MRFs)
Bach, Huang, London, and Getoor (2013) to jointly infer labels of spam messages.
The remaining chapters accomplish the following: Chapter 2 goes over
definitions, techniques, and tools necessary for this paper. Chapter 3 highlights
the most important work related to this research. Chapter 4 describes the
methodology of our approach to detecting spam. Chapter 5 reveals the results
from our experiments for the independent and relational models. Finally, Chapter 6
concludes with a short discussion and possible directions for future work.
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Each chapter in this thesis contains coauthored material with professor
Daniel Lowd who advised the work in each chapter. This coauthored material
will be published in the proceedings of the 2017 AAAI workshop on artificial
intelligence and cyber security (AICS) under the title ’Collective Classification of
Social Network Spam’.
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CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND: DEFINITIONS AND TOOLKITS
From Jonathan Brophy and Daniel Lowd. 2017 AAAI Workshop on
Artificial Intelligence and Cyber-Security (AICS). San Francisco, CA.
This chapter reviews the various definitions, techniques, and toolkits that
this thesis relies on.
Random Forest
Given D = {X ,Y}, X = {X1, ..., Xn} and Y = {Y1, ..., Yn} is a list of data
instances, Xi = {x1, ..., xm} is a vector of features, and Yi = {y1, ..., yk} is a set
of labels that Xi can take on. Random forest is an independent machine learning
classifier that maps X to Y . It utilizes a collection of decision trees Quinlan
(1986) (hence the name forest) to make a decision about which label to assign to
a particular instance Xi. Each tree classifier gets a subset of the features in Xi.
The subset of features are chosen randomly by sampling (hence the name random),
and the same distribution is used to obtain the feature subset for each tree Breiman
(2001).
SciKit-Learn
Scikit-Learn 1 is a python framework that focuses on machine learning. It
contains many state of the art algorithms that are easy to use with high level APIs
and well maintained documentation. Scikit-Learn is utilized in both academia and
industry Pedregosa et al. (2011). It can help with a wide range of tasks from data
preprocessing, data reduction, and model selection, to classification, regression, and
clustering. We utilize scikit-learn for its random forest implementation and for its
ability to compute performance metrics on the output of our models.
1scikit-learn.org/stable
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Graph Algorithms
Given a directed graph G = {V,E} where V are the vertices and E are the
edges, the following are common algorithms capable of running on G and assigning
a number to each vertex based on the count and directionality of edges entering
and leaving it.
Pagerank. Pagerank is a well known algorithm which gives us a sense of
which nodes are more important than others by looking at which nodes receive the
most links Page, Brin, Motwani, and Winograd (1999).
Triangle Count. This algorithm counts the number of triangles a
particular vertex is a part of, indicating the connectivity of that node Schank and
Wagner (2005).
K-Core. An iterative algorithm that removes the least connected nodes
on every iteration, and assigns the removed node an id number corresponding
to the iteration that it was pruned Alvarez-Hamelin, Dall’Asta, Barrat, and
Vespignani (2005).
In-Degree. Counts the number of edges that enter a particular vertex
Newman, Strogatz, and Watts (2001).
Out-Degree. Counts the number of edges that leave a particular vertex
Newman et al. (2001).
Graphlab
Graphlab 2 is a machine learning tool built for python similar to Scikit-
Learn. Graphlab contains many of the same state-of-the-art algorithms that
Scikit-Learn provides, but it can also perform graph-based algorithms like those
mentioned above, on very large graphs in a distributed format that is still easy to
2turi.com
5
use. Their specially designed dataframe and attention to distributed computation
makes their toolkit easy use when parallelizing common machine learning tasks on
large datasets Low et al. (2010).
Markov Networks
There are two main types of probabilistic graphical models (PGMs):
Bayesian networks (BNs) and Markov networks (MNs), which are also called
Markov Random Fields (MRFs). Markov networks are represented by an
undirected graph G containing a node for each random variable X = {Xi, ..., Xn}
∈ X Pearl (2014). Each clique in G defines a real-valued nonnegative potential
function φm representing the state of the corresponding clique. The joint
distribution represented by the network is given as
P (X = x) =
1
Z
∏
k
φk(x{k}) (2.1)
where φk(x{k}) is the state of the variables in the kth clique. Z is called the
partition function, and it is there to make sure (2.1) is a valid probability. It is
simply the sum of the product of all cliques:
Z =
∑
x∈X
∏
k
φk(x{k}) (2.2)
It is typically computationally more convenient to represent the markov network
as a log-linear model by replacing the product of potential functions by an
exponentiated weighted sum of features of the state:
P (X = x) =
1
Z
exp
(∑
i
wifi(x)
)
(2.3)
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where wi is typically the log of the parameter for the clique in the state of x, and
fi(x) is typically a binary indicator feature in {0,1}.
First Order Logic
A first order knowledge base (KB) is a set of sentences or formulas in first
order logic Richardson and Domingos (2006). A formula consists of predicates,
logical variables, constants, and logical connectives. The following is a sample
formula in a first order KB:
Friends(x,y) ∧ Smokes(x)→ Smokes(y) (2.4)
This formula reads: ’if x and y are friends, and x smokes, than y is more likely to
smoke’. Friends() and Smokes() are predicates that contain logical variables x and
y. These logical variables can be replaced with constants such as Anna or Bob.
When all variables in a predicate are replaced with constants, that predicate has
been ’ground out’, and when all predicates in a formula have been ground out,
then that formula has been ground out. Once a formula has been ground out
and replaced with values, the logical connectives can determine if the formula is
satisfied or not.
Fuzzy Logic
Fuzzy logic is a form of logic in which variables can take on a value in the
range [0,1], as opposed to boolean logic, where variables take on values in the set
{0,1}. Fuzzy logic can be used to apply partial truth to a variable’s value. This is
beneficial when there exists a KB that is inexact, incomplete, or not totally reliable
Zadeh (1988).
Lukasiewicz T-Norm. Lukasiewicz logic defines semantics for
combining variables containing partial truth values with boolean connectives
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LOGIC, Garrido, and Garrido (2010). The following are the connectives used in
this paper:
Negation : F¬(x) = 1− x
Implication : F→(x, y) = min{1, 1− x+ y}
Strong Conjunction : F∧(x, y) = max{0, x+ y − 1}
Strong Disjunction : F∨(x, y) = min{1, x+ y}
(2.5)
Hinge-Loss MRFs
Hinge-loss MRFs (HL-MRFs) are log-linear models that use hinge loss
functions of the variable states as features and can be modeled as a conditional
probability distribution as follows Bach et al. (2013):
P (Y |X) = 1
Z(Ω)
exp
(− n∑
i=1
ωiφi(X, Y )
)
(2.6)
Where Z(Ω) =
∫
Y
exp
( −∑ni=1 ωiφi(X, Y )) is the normalization constant that is
dependent on the weights Ω, and φi is the hinge-loss value of continuous potential:
φi(X, Y ) = [max{0, `i(X, Y )}]pj (2.7)
where `i(X, Y ) is a linear loss function between X and Y using equations defined in
(2.5), and pj takes on a value in {1,2} to control the shape of the hinge loss.
Probabilistic Soft Logic
Probabilistic Soft Logic (PSL) 3 is software developed by researchers in
the LINQS SRL group at the University of Maryland and UC Santa Cruz Bach,
Broecheler, Huang, and Getoor (2015). PSL allows the user to construct weighted
3psl.linqs.org
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rules of the form in (2.4), where the weight of each formula ωi determines how
important that rule is. PSL can then use these weighted rules as templates to
construct an HL-MRF, where each ground out predicate is a node in the HL-MRF,
and each ground out formula forms a clique in the HL-MRF.
Inference can then be performed efficiently on the resulting HL-MRF as
the continuous nature of variables in the range [0,1] paves the way for convex
optimization. Weight learning can also be applied to the rules by performing
inference many times with various weight values until the optimal weights are
found. Thus, PSL is an efficient reasoning tool that handles complexity with logic,
and uncertainty with a special type of probabilistic graphical model.
Metrics
The following define the metrics used in this paper to evaluate our models.
Let us define a set of labeled instances Y where each instance takes on a value
{0,1}, Yˆ is the estimate from the model where each instance can take on a value
[0,1]. Now we can explain the following:
PR Curve. Precision-Recall curves represent the precision and recall
values for many different thresholds. For example, a threshold of 0.75 might be
chosen, where any prediction ≥ 0.75 is labeled 1 and anything below 0.75 as
0. Then the precision and recall for this threshold can be computed using the
following Davis and Goadrich (2006):
Precision =
TP
TP + FP
Recall =
TP
TP + FN
(2.8)
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These curves are useful because it allows the user to see how their model performs
on a wide range of thresholds, giving better overall performance characteristics of
the model.
ROC Curve. The receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve is
similar to the precision-recall curve in that it measures points at many thresholds,
but instead of precision and recall, it measures the true positive rate (TPR) against
the false positive rate (FPR) Davis and Goadrich (2006):
TPR = Recall =
TP
TP + FN
FPR =
FP
FP + TN
(2.9)
AUPR. The area under the precision-recall curve (AUPR) is the
integral of the curve in an attempt to boil down the curve into one number. This
is a convenient way to get a quick glance at model performance, but viewing the
actual curve is generally more informative.
AUROC. Similar to the AUPR, this is the area under the ROC curve.
Also similar to the AUPR, it is more informative to look at the actual ROC curve.
10
CHAPTER III
RELATED WORK
From Jonathan Brophy and Daniel Lowd. 2017 AAAI Workshop on
Artificial Intelligence and Cyber-Security (AICS). San Francisco, CA.
Spam is a long-standing problem for many domains, and identifying user
behavior is a reasonable step towards capturing more sophisticated spammers. Liu
et al. use topic modeling to detect spammers on Weibo, a popular social network
in China Liu et al. (2016). Wang and Pu extracted behavioral characteristics from
users to help identify URL spam in Twitter data Wang and Pu (2015).
Collective classification (CC) is a promising method of dealing with
complex relational data. Sen et al. explore document classification from the well
known Cora and Citeseer datasets using a number of different CC algorithms
such as iterative classification algorithm (ICA), Gibbs sampling (GS), loopy
belief propagation (LBP), and mean-field relaxation labeling (MF) Sen et al.
(2008). Laorden et al. studied the prominence of email spam and created a text
classification model using collective filtering in a semi-supervised setting Laorden,
Sanz, Santos, Gala´n-Garc´ıa, and Bringas (2011).
Online social networks offer up a network structure well suited for collective
classification. Lee et al. devised a model to accurately detect emerging trending
topics in Twitter to focus a model’s attention in places where spam is most likely to
occur Lee, Caverlee, Kamath, and Cheng (2012). Zhu et al. studied spam content
in one of China’s most popular social network services, renren.com, in which they
looked at the social activities between users and came up with a compact matrix
factorization of the problem with social regularization to identify spammers Zhu
11
et al. (2012). Fakhraei et al. utilize user reports and PSL to collectively classify
spammers in a social dating network Fakhraei et al. (2015).
Rayana and Akoglu built a unified framework where features are extracted
based on language and behavior models in addition to relational data from the
network. In this case, they used these features to detect fake reviews on various
datasets on Yelp.com Rayana and Akoglu (2015).
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CHAPTER IV
METHODOLOGY
From Jonathan Brophy and Daniel Lowd. 2017 AAAI Workshop on
Artificial Intelligence and Cyber-Security (AICS). San Francisco, CA.
The first task is to build an independent model that combines the best of
both worlds from content-based and graph-based systems in order to create a solid
baseline and starting point for our relational model. Our independent model is
comprised of three different feature sets. One list of engineered features focuses on
the content of the messages and constitutes our content-based feature set. Another
list of engineered features extracts user behavior which makes up the graph-based
feature set. A third and final feature set includes engineered features based on the
relational aspects related to the domain of the network and serves as candidate
features to be explored further in the relational model.
The second task involves building a first order KB and instantiate that
KB into an HL-MRF Bach et al. (2013) using PSL where efficient inference can
be applied. Three relational models of increasing complexity are explored in this
domain. Each successive model builds upon the previous one and attempts to
capture a different relational signal among the relational entities in the domain.
Independent Model
Our independent model uses random forest to do the classification and is
trained using features from the following three feature sets:
Content-Based Features. By looking at just the text of each
comment, the following content-based features are extracted: the number of
characters, NumChars, and a boolean indicating whether or not the comment
contains a link, HasLink. Bag of words and k-grams could also be explored, but
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this causes the feature space to increase very quickly and necessitates constant
updating of these features. These two features make up the Content feature set
(Table 1).
Graph-Based Features. The next set of features look at user behavior
based on the connectivity of users to other users using the list of follower actions.
We can represent this list of affiliations as a graph G by constructing a node for
every user in the list, and then add a directed edge from user x to user y whenever
user x starts to follow user y. For example, the graph in (Figure 1) shows that U1
follows U2 and U3. We then run all of the algorithms from (Chapter II: Graph
Algorithms) on G.
Figure 1. Sample follower graph constructed from follower actions.
Each one of these algorithms represent a different way of finding essentially the
same thing, how connected a user is to other users in the network. This information
is useful because it can give us insight into some of the behavior that characterizes
spammers and non-spammers. This is the same approach used in Fakhraei et al.
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(2015), except they explore a number of different actions between users, whereas
we explore only one relation, users following other users. All features in this set are
computed using Graphlab and can be summed up in the Graph-based feature set
(Table 1).
Independent model features
Content
NumChars Number of chars in msg.
HasLink True if msg has a URL, else False.
Graph-based
Pagerank Pagerank of each node in the follower graph G.
TriCnt Number of triangles of each node in G.
KCore Iteration each node in G was pruned.
InDegree Number of edges entering a node in G.
OutDegree Number of edges leaving a node in G.
Relational
UUps UserUploads, number of user uploaded tracks.
UComs UserComs, number of user msgs.
ULComs UserLinkComs, number of user msgs with a URL.
ULRatio UserLinkComsRatio, fraction of user msgs with a URL.
TrackSpam Number of spam msgs per track.
Trackham Number of non-spam msgs per track.
CMSRatio ComMatchSpamRatio, fraction of matching spam msgs.
Table 1. Features in the independent model, grouped into three different feature
sets.
Relational Features. There are three main entities in the data
that we focus on: users, comments, and tracks. The final set of features in the
independent model focuses on the connections between these entities. UserUploads
is the number of tracks uploaded by each user. UserComments is the number of
comments posted by each user. UserLinkComments is the number of comments
posted by each user that contain a link in their message. UserLinkCommentsRatio
is the fraction of comments previously posted by each user that contain a link in
the message over the total number of messages posted by that user.
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TrackSpam and TrackHam are the number of spam and non-spam comments
on each track, respectively. Finally, CommentMatchSpamRatio is, given a comment,
the fraction of other matching comments that are marked as spam over the total
number of other matching comments. For example, if a comment with the message
‘hey’ matches 3 other comments because they have the same message ‘hey’, and 2
of them were marked as spam, then the fraction of matching spam messages would
be 2
3
.
All features in this final set are computed in sequential order of comments
based on their timestamp. For example, when computing UserUploads for comment
#100 posted by user x, we record the number of tracks uploaded by user x up until
comment #100. This creates a more realistic scenario as features are computed
only based on previous comments. The only features not computed in sequential
fashion are the graph-based features and UserTracks. This is due to the fact
that tracks and follower actions are large separate entities from the comments,
requiring computationally long queries for every comment. This final feature set
is summarized in the Relational feature set (Table 1).
These relational features are important because they represent candidate
features for our relational model. Each one of these features in some way connects
users to comments, users to tracks, tracks to comments, and comments to
comments. This independent model uses random forest as its classifier and
information gain to rank relative feature importance. If these features have high
relative importance, then there is a good chance their relational nature can be
exploited further in a dedicated relational model.
By utilizing features in the relational set, the independent model simulates
some of the behavior occurring in the relational model. This improves performance,
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but does not allow the model to reason about multiple relationships simultaneously.
Jointly inferring labels for all messages based on those connections can capture
complex signals missed by this independent model.
The next section discusses which relational features are worth exploring in
more depth and how they can be exploited in the relational model.
Relational Model
The semantics of PSL make it easy to create an HL-MRF using rules of the
form as in (2.4). We combine multiple rules to create three relational models of
increasing complexity.
Users. The first model takes the predictions from the independent
model and separates each prediction into varying levels of confidence. For example,
if the independent model classifies a comment as spam with a probability of 0.98,
then our relational model can use this information to more confidently label this
comment as spam (Figure 2).
ωa : ¬spam(comment)
ωb : ¬spammer(user)
ωc : superSpam(comment)→ spam(comment)
ωd : semiSpam(comment)→ spam(comment)
ωe : superHam(comment)→¬spam(comment)
ωf : semiHam(comment)→¬spam(comment)
ωg : posts(user, comment) ∧ spam(comment)→ spammer(user)
ωh : posts(user, comment) ∧ ¬spam(comment)→¬spammer(user)
ωi : posts(user, comment) ∧ spammer(user)→ spam(comment)
ωj : posts(user, comment) ∧ ¬spammer(user)→¬spam(comment)
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
(j)
Figure 2. Relational model using predictions from an independent model as priors
in addition to user behavior to classify spam.
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Rules (a) and (b) denote initial priors that most comments are not spam and that
most users are not spammers, which is a fair assumption due to the imbalanced
nature of spam data. Rules (c)-(f) provide additional prior evidence for each
comment from the independent model.
Rules (g)-(j) display the first example of how these rules can work together
to propagate label information. Take rule (g) for example, if a user posts a
comment, and that comment is spammy, then that user is more likely to be a
spammer. Thus, if we have any information about that comment, whether it is
more or less spammy, then we can start to get a sense of whether or not the user is
a spammer or non-spammer. In this case, we do have some prior information about
these comments due to the first six rules of our model.
Now that we have some information about the user, we can use that
information to help label comments posted by that user. Take rule (i) for example,
which says that if a user posts a comment, and that user is a spammer, then that
comment is more likely to be spam. After gaining initial evidence that this user
posted a spammy comment, it is now more likely that other comments posted by
this user will also be spammy. PSL works to simultaneously satisfy all rules in
the model, and it is for this reason as well as the interconnected structure of the
network that we can reason about multiple users and comments at the same time.
Comments. After some preliminary experiments, the independent
model identified a relational feature with high relative importance,
CommentMatchSpamRatio. Thus, the second model builds on the first one by
exploring the relational nature of this feature. This feature computes the fraction
of matching comments that are marked as spam over the total number of matching
comments. The intuition is that spammers tend to post similar comments from one
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or multiple accounts. Using PSL, we can write rules similar to the bottom four in
Figure 2 to capture this behavior (Figure 3).
model 1 rules
+
ωk : inHub(hub, comment) ∧ spam(comment)→ spamHub(hub)
ωl : inHub(hub, comment) ∧ ¬spam(comment)→¬spamHub(hub)
ωm : inHub(hub, comment) ∧ spamHub(hub)→ spam(comment)
ωn : inHub(hub, comment) ∧ ¬spamHub(hub)→¬spam(comment)
(k)
(l)
(m)
(n)
Figure 3. Second relational model that adds rules about matching comments
belonging to spam or non-spam hubs.
.
Four rules are added in this second relational model, and it follows the
same structure as the last four rules in the first model. Rules (k) and (m) are
used to propagate information in both directions, while rules (l) and (n) act as
complements to these rules to preserve information about non-spam comments
and non-spam hubs. These rules could have been written in such a way that treats
comments individually. For example, rule (k) could have been written in the form:
matches(c1, c2) ∧ spam(c1)→ spam(c2) (4.1)
Rules (l)-(n) could be re-written in a similar fashion, and this would accomplish
essentially the thing as rules (k)-(n) in Figure 3. We chose to group comments
into hubs to increase efficiency and reduce the number edges connecting ground
atoms. Suppose we were using (4.1) above and we had 100 comments, the
resulting graphical model would need at least 10,000 edges to take care of every
possible combination of comments. By grouping comments into hubs, where a hub
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represents all comments that match each other, we cut down on the number of
possible configurations that can arise.
Now we can propagate information similar to model 1, if a comment is
part of a hub, and that comment is spammy, then the hub itself becomes more
spammy. If we see more evidence of spam comments belonging to this hub, then
the relational model becomes more confident of labeling that hub as a spamHub.
Now if a comment is encountered and the model does not have strong evidence of
whether it is spam or non-spam, but it sees that it is part of a spamHub, then it
can be more confident that the comment should be labeled as spam.
This model starts out with no prior knowledge of whether hubs are spammy
or non-spammy; they all start as neutral. As information begins to propagate
between comments, users, and hubs, these hubs slowly start to turn more spammy
or non-spammy. Ultimately, this helps classify comments that are hard to judge at
first glance, but become more obvious by studying their connections to other users
and comments.
Tracks. The third model introduces four more rules added on to the
second model, and these new rules bridge the relational gap between tracks and
comments (Figure 4).
model 2 rules
+
ωo : inTrack(track, comment) ∧ spam(comment)→ sTrack(track)
ωp : inTrack(track, comment) ∧ ¬spam(comment)→¬sTrack(track)
ωq : inTrack(track, comment) ∧ sTrack(track)→ spam(comment)
ωr : inTrack(track, comment) ∧ ¬sTrack(track)→¬spam(comment)
(o)
(p)
(q)
(r)
Figure 4. Third relational model identifying comments belonging to spammy or
non-spammy tracks; sTrack is short for spamTrack.
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The rules added in this model correspond to the relational features
TrackSpam and TrackHam present in the independent model. Those features
represent the number of spam comments and non-spam comments for each track,
respectively. The notion of tracks in this model is the same idea as hubs in the
second model. Tracks start out as neutral, and as they accumulate evidence,
become places more likely for spam or ham to be posted. PSL makes it easy to
express these complex relationships with simple rules and syntax.
This third model is now much more powerful as it captures signals from
various relationships within the data. All the rules work in conjunction as the HL-
MRF attempts to satisfy them simultaneously. It is important to note though, that
adding rules may improve the performance of the model, but that comes at the cost
of more complexity and possible intractability, as too many rules makes inference
over the graphical model too difficult.
URLs. A fourth model was explored that added four more rules creating
hubs based on matching URLs. If a comment contained any URLs, then the first
URL was extracted and put into its respective hub. The idea is that there are
significant differences between the URLs that spammers post as opposed to the
URLs that non-spammers post. After some preliminary experiments though, the
addition of these rules did not improve the model very much, but this could be due
to a lack of URLs in the comments being tested and may be worth exploring again
on a data set with numerous URL postings.
Weight Learning. It is preferable to learn the weights of these rules
than to guess their relative importance. PSL allows the relational model to learn
the weights of the rules using data. After initializing all the weights, they can then
be learned by computing the gradient of the log-likelihood of (2.6) with respect to
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an individual weight ω, and applying expectation maximization to find the most
probable explanation given the current set of weights Kimmig, Bach, Broecheler,
Huang, and Getoor (2012).
Learning the weights to the relational model takes up the majority of the
running time as it essentially performs inference many times as it computes the
optimal weights given the data. Once the weights are learned, they can then be
used to do joint inference on a different subset of the data, or on a separate domain
entirely, given that the rules of the relational model make sense in both domains.
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CHAPTER V
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
From Jonathan Brophy and Daniel Lowd. 2017 AAAI Workshop on
Artificial Intelligence and Cyber-Security (AICS). San Francisco, CA.
This chapter presents the data used in this work, explains how the
experiments were setup, and shows the performance for both the independent and
relational models.
Data
The dataset comes from Soundcloud.com and includes an entire year’s
worth of comments from October 10, 2012 to September 30, 2013. The data came
containing information about comments, tracks, follower actions, spam warnings,
and spam reports.
For each comment, we have the anonymized user id of the user that posted
the comment, the anonymized track id the comment was posted on, a timestamp
of when the comment was posted, the actual message of the comment, and a label
indicating whether the comment was marked as spam or not.
For each track, we have the anonymized track id, the anonymized user id of
who uploaded the track, the duration of the track, and a timestamp of the track’s
last update.
Soundcloud allows each user the ability to follow other users. Thus, for
each follower action, we have the anonymized user id of user y being followed, the
anonymized user id of user x doing the following, and a timestamp indicating when
user x started following user y.
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Entity Count
non-spam comments 42,099,424
spam comments 684,338
tracks 7,796,019
follower actions 335,197,112
non-spammers 5,377,679
spammers 128,016
Table 2. Soundcloud Statistics.
For each spam warning, we have the anonymized user id of the user
receiving the warning, the warning level, the reason for the warning, a timestamp of
when the warning was issued, and a binary suspended label for each warning.
For each spam report, we have the anonymized user id of the user that
posted the comment, a timestamp of when the comment was published, and a
binary suspended label for each report.
The basic statistics of this dataset reveal just how imbalanced the class
labels are distributed throughout the comments (Table 2).
Experiment Setup
We need a baseline to compare our relational model performance to,
and so we attempt to build the best independent model we can as to make our
comparisons meaningful. Thus, our first set of experiments involves running
the independent model on our data with differing combinations of feature sets
introduced in (Chapter IV: Independent Model) to find the best features to use
in our independent model.
Moving onto our relational model, we perform two sets of experiments to
evaluate its performance. Each experiment consists of the following:
– A subset of 2 million consecutive comments is chosen from the SoundCloud
dataset. Those 2 million comments are split in half to create two smaller data
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sets, D1 and D2. D1 is used for weight learning while D2 is used for testing
and evaluation.
– The independent model trains on the first 70% of the of the data in D1, and
then generates predictions on the remaining 30% of D1. The same is then
done for D2.
– The relational model then learns weights for its rules using the generated
predictions from D1, and finally does joint inference on the remaining 30% of
comments in D2.
The area under the precision-recall curve (AUPR) is the main metric used
in these experiments to evaluate how each model is performing. Predictions on the
test set from the independent and relational models are recorded and run through
Scikit’s metrics framework.
Before the AUPR is computed, a small amount of noise (a random number
between 0 and 2.5×10−3) is added to each prediction in both models. This
maintains the underlying label the models have assigned to each comment, but
prevents ties in the predictions to avoid optimistic estimates in the precision-
recall curve. If the model contains numerous ties in predictions, as the level of
recall varies, the precision does not necessarily change linearly, and thus linear
interpolation between points is not an optimal strategy for computing the area
under the curve Davis and Goadrich (2006). Thus, adding a small random amount
of noise can help combat this problem while calculating the AUPR.
The area under the Receiver Operating Characteristic (AUROC), is also
recorded for each model, but due to the heavy skew present in the data, should not
be viewed as the main factor when evaluating model performance. This is due to
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the fact that the ROC curve takes the true negatives into account when calculating
the false positive rate (FPR), and thus a large change in false positives will greatly
affect precision and the precision-recall curve, while inducing a small change on
the FPR and the resulting ROC curve Davis and Goadrich (2006), revealing overly
optimistic model performance.
Independent model results
We first test our independent model by running it with each feature set
individually, and then combining them all into one super feature set. By doing
this, we can see the relative performance and importance of each feature set. In
many of the experiments tested on the independent model, the content features
generally performed the worst, the graph features did somewhat better, followed by
the relational features, and finally the combination of all the feature sets (Figure 5,
Table 3).
— Content - - - Graph · · · Relational · − · All
Figure 5. Independent model showing performance using different feature sets.
Comments used: 6 million to 8 million, tested on the last 300k comments (left).
Comments used: 38 million to 40 million, tested on the last 300k comments (right).
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Dataset Content Graph Relational All
6M-8M 0.512 0.505 0.671 0.788
38M-40M 0.288 0.315 0.579 0.778
Table 3. Independent model performance using different feature sets. AUPR scores
are reported.
These relative performance curves are encouraging from a robustness
standpoint, as content features are the easiest for a spammer to manipulate, graph
features are harder to manipulate, and relational features the most difficult. Thus,
the harder to manipulate features are deemed most important by our independent
model, which we can exploit further in our relational model, making our relational
model also more robust to spammer manipulations.
Relational model results
The following two sections report experiments as outlined in the experiment
setup for two different scenarios. First, we evaluate the performance of the three
relational models introduced in (Chapter IV: Relational Model), where each
successive model adds more complexity than its predecessor. Thus, we can see
the changes in performance by adding more rules to our relational model. Second,
we use the last and most complex relational model to evaluate performance on
different comment subsets in the overall Soundcloud dataset.
Increasing Model Complexity. This section presents the results
of three different models presented in (Chapter IV: Relational Model). In each
experiment, models are trained and tested on a 2 million comment subset of the
data from comments 31 million to 33 million.
The addition of more rules increases the performance for each relational
model tested on this set of comments (Figure 6). We already see an improvement
in the first relational model by propagating information back and forth between
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— Independent - - - Relational
Figure 6. Three relational models of increasing complexity tested on the same
data set (comments 31 million to 33 million). Model 1 with priors and spammer
information (left). Model 2 with rules added to capture matching comments
(middle). Model 3 that adds rules about how spammy certain tracks are (right).
users and comments, using the predictions from the independent model as priors to
give us a starting point of information to work with. The second model improves
upon the first by working to label the matching comments. If more comments had
matches to other comments in this data set, then this model would most likely
provide even bigger improvements.
Finally, adding rules about spammy tracks makes a vast improvement over
the second model (Table 4). This indicates that certain tracks tend to act as hubs
for spam comments. Preliminary work found that the majority of spam comments
are concentrated in a small fraction of the total number of tracks, and tended to be
on tracks that contained many other comments. This makes sense, as spam posted
on popular tracks is more likely to be seen by many users.
Varying Comment Datasets. In this section, we choose three
different subsets of 2 million consecutive comments each, spaced out among the
full data set. Some statistics about each subset of comments are recorded (Table
5), such as the number of hubs containing more than one matching comment.
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Model AUPR AUROC
Independent 0.586 0.819
Relational 1 0.695 0.869
Relational 2 0.739 0.908
Relational 3 0.825 0.962
Table 4. Comparison of different relational models to the baseline independent
model on comments 31 million to 33 million.
These counts help visualize the characteristics of the test set and possibly provide
some idea of how useful certain rules will be. For example, a data set with just as
many tracks as comments means that each comment is posted on a different track,
reducing the viability of the rules added in the third relational model.
Entity 6M-8M 31M-33M 38M-40M
Spam 1,882 1,688 2,427
Users 118,725 134,759 139,292
Hubs 9,927 11,012 11,884
Tracks 135,414 143,545 139,421
Table 5. Count of different entities contained in the test set of each comment group
(last 300k comments).
Relative improvements of the relational model over the independent model
can be seen in each data set (Figure 7). Some of the precision-recall curves for the
independent model are already pretty good, leaving less room for our relational
model to improve upon, but the difference is still noticeable. The AUPR and
AUROC scores for both models in each comment subset is also recorded (Table
6).
The increase in performance of the relational model to the independent
model is evident for each comment subset, but the improvements seem to get better
for the comment subsets that occur later in time. This could be due to the fact
that the independent model’s engineered features have not seen as many examples
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— Independent - - - Relational
Figure 7. Relational model 3 tested on three different subsets of comments in the
data. Comments used: 6 million to 8 million, tested on the last 300k comments
(left). Comments used: 31 million to 33 million, tested on the last 300k comments
(Middle). Comments used: 38 million to 40 million, tested on the last 300k
comments (right).
Dataset AUPR (Ind) AUPR (Rel)
6M-8M 0.792 0.873
31M-33M 0.588 0.825
38M-40M 0.792 0.915
Table 6. Comparison of relational model 3 on different comment datasets.
for the earlier comments. This can cause less accurate predictions that get fed into
the relational model which might propagate information less accurately.
Extra Observations. One additional experiment used the previous
700K comments before the test set as extra evidence for the relational model.
Thus, more hubs, users, and tracks were inferred as spammy or non-spammy, and
this could help identify spam in the test set. For example, if a user shows up many
times posting spam in the evidence set, and only posts one comment in the test set,
it is easy to infer that the comment in the test set is probably also spam. Without
these extra observations, we have no previous evidence of what kind of user they
are, making it harder to classify their single comment in the test set.
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After running relational model 3 with extra evidence on the 31 million to
33 million comment subset, the results did not make a big improvement over the
model without extra observations. This could be due to a lack of overlap between
users, matching comments, and tracks between the evidence and test sets, but this
lack of improvement is also encouraging. Since we already know that large increases
in performance can be made from doing joint inference over the test set, then we
know that we can get good results from a smaller graphical model that uses less
computation. So it is possible to reason that this evidence set can be replaced by a
larger test set where joint inference can label even more comments at the same time
with more accuracy than with a smaller test set. This implies the ability to scale
the relational model to label more instances collectively.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
From Jonathan Brophy and Daniel Lowd. 2017 AAAI Workshop on
Artificial Intelligence and Cyber-Security (AICS). San Francisco, CA.
We have shown the benefits of using a model that can leverage the
underlying connections present between the data in Soundcloud. With the aid of
an independent model to mark clear instances of spam and provide a starting point
of information, our relational model can work to identify the perhaps intentionally
obfuscated comments missed by the independent classifier.
We have seen that adding more rules to a relational classifier can increase its
performance, but adding too many can cause a bottleneck in computation time. It
is not hard to see the benefits of using a relational model, where implementations
like PSL make it very easy to express simple rules that can capture complex
relationships throughout the data.
One final aspect to note about this approach is the relationship between the
independent and relational models. Since the predictions from the independent
model are fed into the relational model, any performance improvement in the
independent model will most likely translate to improved performance for the
relational model as well. Thus, more in depth natural language processing (NLP)
features could be engineered for the independent model, but these are not explicitly
necessary to show the relative improvements of the relational model.
The next step of this work would involve testing this model on a different,
but similar domain to see if these results can be replicated. YouTube.com would
make an excellent choice, as its popularity certainly attracts many spammers, and
its social network structure is similar to that of SoundClouds’. Tracks could be
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replaced by videos, since users post comments to other user’s videos the same way
users post comments to other user’s tracks. All the other rules can essentially stay
the same.
There is also the opportunity to learn weights in one domain, and then
test their effectiveness on another domain. Also, more work needs to be done on
characterizing the practical size of data instances that can be jointly labeled at
one time, and how this characterization changes as the number of rules increase or
decrease.
One segment of the data that was not used involved spam warnings and
spam reports. The ability of one user to flag other users is a common feature
in most social networks, and this information can lead to clues about who the
spammers are, as well as the credibility of users doing the flagging, as in Fakhraei
et al. (2015).
The applications for this kind of model are not bound to social networks.
Any type of data that houses underlying relations can benefit from this
methodology, and it is exciting to see what other domains relational machine
learning will impact.
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